Image 1. An open bunker
area containing a variety of
live AP and AT mines.
All graphics courtesy of the author.

Falkland Islands
By Colin King [ Fenix Insight Ltd. ]

Background
Throughout the eleven-year mine clearance program in the Falkland

this took the form of a remote desktop study based on images of

Islands, the exploitation (disassembly, detailed analysis, and testing) of

recovered mines, which were compared to inert examples and techni-

live mines was a regular feature. In addition to assessing the condi-

cal data held by Fenix Insight Ltd. The aim was to consider the likely

tion of the mines in order to optimize the safety and efficiency of the

effects of ageing and their implications for the handling and disposal

clearance process, there was intense interest in the subject of long-term

of the mines.

residual risk.

Soon after, the LRC also began to encounter Argentinian M1 and

The rigorous demining program was highly successful, and the

Israeli No. 6 anti-tank (AT) mines, as well as Argentinian FMK-1 AP

Falkland Islands have now been declared clear. However, a mine

mines. Once again, as the clearance program entered its final phase,

recently washed up on the shore near the Capital, Stanley, and it’s pos-

questions of residual risk, handling, and disposal were raised, and an

sible that others will do so over the next few years. It is also clear that

exploitation visit was planned in order to assess

findings from exploitation work in the Falkland Islands can make a

•

the general condition of the mines

significant contribution to the understanding of residual risk in other

•

the functionality of fuzing mechanisms

mine-affected regions.

•

the viability of energetic materials

•

the implications of changes for risk

During the final phases of the program, the discovery of Israeli
No. 4 anti-personnel (AP) mines triggered a request from SafeLane

The work was conducted in March 2019 by Colin King, Technical

Global, the land release contractor (LRC) and Demining Programme

Director of Fenix Insight Ltd, assisted by Max Grace, Fenix Operations

Office (DPO) for a technical assessment of their condition. Initially,

Assistant, and supported by Guy Marot, who ran the DPO.

Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is always a fundamental part of the planning process and follows a well-established Fenix protocol. It considers the like-

scenarios. Where appropriate, controls are then applied to manage the
risk to make it as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

lihood and potential consequence of each hazard in order to allocate a

Previous deployments have illustrated the value of this process

combined risk score, often involving multiple team members in order

when, for example, the worst-case scenario of a firing pin remaining

to capture technical and procedural considerations across a range of

lodged in a live detonator was found to have occurred in several mines.

Logistics
A temporary ammunition processing building (APB) was set up at

retained from previous exploitation phases; this included jigs built

Yorke Bay, outside Stanley, in a shipping container with a workbench

by Fenix for the disassembly of machine-assembled mines. The only

and vice, a generator, and lighting. A specialist tool kit was brought

power tools were a large commercial band saw and a cordless drill.

from the United Kingdom to supplement the tools and equipment
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Image 2. The APB was established in a shipping container,
placed among the sand dunes of Yorke Bay, near the capital,
Stanley.

Image 3. A simple work station was set up, with specialist tools
and disassembly jigs brought from the United Kingdom.

Mines, recovered by the LRC during clearance operations were

conditions that might have altered their state. The M1, No. 6, and No.

retained in open sandbag bunkers within the minefield fences and

4 mines had been dug up in sand and processed through the sifting

therefore well away from public access. Their continued exposure to

system; they had therefore been subjected to significant disturbance,

the weather meant that mines were not subjected to artificially dry

possibly including substantial pressure and vibration.

Methodology
The workflow followed a standard Fenix process map for exploita-

the condition of the body, the fuze mechanism, or the main charge,

tion activity. For each mine type, this involved full disassembly and

a mine is incapable of functioning as designed unless the detonator

examination of critical components. In order to assess the capability

is serviceable. The testing of detonators was therefore critical to the

of a mine to operate as designed, the three main areas of interest were:

real-world evaluation of the risk posed by these mines during the final

•

the integrity of the casing

stages of clearance, and for the prediction of long-term residual risk

•

the functionality of the fuzing mechanism

in other regions.

•

the viability of the explosive compositions

A simple rig was improvised to allow a spring-loaded striker to be

It is well established that secondary high explosives such as TNT

released from behind the cover of the shipping container, while the

remain capable of detonation for many years; this is illustrated by the

test was captured on video. The initiation mechanism was improvised

continuing viability of ammunition from World War I after more than

from a recovered No. 4 mine fuze, with the components restored to

a century. Since the main charge is almost always found intact, the

full functionality and checked before each operation.

key element in the explosive train is the detonator. No matter what

Findings
Throughout the studies on the ageing of mines, the ingress of water

Previous phases of exploitation focused mainly on the plastic-

has been established as the greatest single influence on the degradation

cased mines encountered inland (SB-33, SB-81, P4B, and C3B),

of internal components. This in turn means that the integrity of the

with findings suggesting that the entire population of mines in the

casing (its ability to remain waterproof) is important. The mines that

Falkland Islands might be nearing the end of its operational life.

were present in the Falkland Islands included significantly different

However, the examination of four additional mine types (FMK-1,

designs and materials. Some of the plastic casings proved extremely

M1, No. 4, and No. 6) from coastal areas casts doubt on that conclu-

robust, yet others had degraded badly. Some steel casings had thick

sion, with all of these found to pose a continuing risk during the

external rust but still retained their integrity beneath, while a well-

final stages of clearance. Additionally, unlike those seen previously,

sealed fuze body effectively acts as a separate casing within a casing.

the SB-33 mines examined here showed no indication that they were

The vulnerability of internal components also varies substantially.
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nearing the ends of their operational lives.

Some fuzing mechanisms incorporate virtually impervious plastics

A constant worry in old munitions is the interaction of primary

and stainless steels, while others contain components made from

explosives with some metals to form highly sensitive compounds.

rust-prone iron and mild steel. Explosive initiators also vary in design

Fortunately, most mines of the types that were present in the Falkland

and vulnerability, some being seriously degraded by small amounts

Islands use aluminum or plastic detonator capsules, and there is no

of salt water.

evidence that this is a problem.
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Image 4. A section through the Argentinian FMK-1 shows that
the casing, charge, and fuzing components are in excellent
condition.

Image 7. A section through the No. 6 mine reveals that, much
like the No. 4, the fuze is partially seized but the explosive train
remains functional.

Image 5. A section through the Israeli No. 4 mine. The
fuze striker is partially seized, but the explosive train is still
functional.

Image 8. A disassembled Italian SB-33 mine, showing most
components in good condition.

Image 6. The heavily rusted casing of the Israeli No. 6 AT mine.

The only consistent theme is the condition of the secondary explosive where, as expected, all of the main charges and boosters remained
functional. In general, the risk from this bulk energetic material is

Image 9. Most of the M1 mines were heavily rusted.

only significant if an operational initiation train is also present. It’s
not that this secondary explosive is safe, since it clearly retains the

were heavily rusted and sometimes barely recognizable. However, the

potential to cause accidents if mistreated, but detonation requires a

SB-81 striker springs were heavily corroded, and the detonators’ stab-

level of energy input well beyond those involved in everyday events,

receptors were non-functional, rendering the mines incapable of oper-

such as bonfires or digging.

ating as designed.

Quite often with aged ammunition, what you see is what you get; if

Meanwhile, underneath layers of rust, the M1 casings were largely

it looks badly degraded then generally it is. But nothing better illus-

intact, firmly encapsulating robust TNT charges. The M1 fuze has a

trates the need for exploitation, or the potential for counter-intuitive

heavy brass body, offering complete protection to the mechanical

findings, than the Italian SB-81 and Argentinian M1 AT mines. Most

and energetic components within. Testing the detonator established

of the SB-81 mines looked almost factory-fresh, while the M1 mines

beyond doubt that these mines were fully capable of functioning.
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Image 10. Detonators from the SB-33 mines appeared
virtually as-new, and were fully functional.

Image 12. The SB-81 striker springs had rusted away.

Image 11. Externally, most SB-81 mines appeared to be in
excellent condition.

Image 13. The stab-receptors of the SB-81 detonators were no
longer functional.

Key Conclusions on Residual Risk
The variety of designs and materials means that each mine compo-

The presence of sand and salt water added further ageing influences

nent has its own level of vulnerability, combining to incline the entire

to those present inland, with sand having abrasive effects and block-

mine towards resilience or susceptibility. The failure of one key com-

ing mechanisms, and salt water being more corrosive. This means that

ponent will usually prevent the mine from functioning as designed;

mines in coastal areas should deteriorate faster than similar types

however, the simultaneous failure of two key features adds a signifi-

located inland, but this was not always found to be the case. P4B and

cant level of confidence, particularly if one failure relates to the fuzing

SB-81 mines were definitely in worse condition than those recovered

mechanism, and the other is within the explosive train. This is the case

inland, yet the Italian SB-33 AP mines were better, possibly reflecting

for the SB-81 and C3B AT mines, which are the only two types that

tighter insertion of the detonator plug to seal the mines.

have washed ashore. Should this occur again, there is a high degree of
confidence that these mines would not be operational.
The nature of the environmental influences is also important,

Islands as the clearance program neared conclusion. The findings

accepting that the micro-climate in which mines are located may vary

might apply to these mine types in similar environments, if they were

significantly, even if they are close together. For example, one mine

to be encountered in other regions.

may be partially buried in very wet ground, while another nearby may
rest on the surface of well-drained soil but be exposed to sunlight.
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Table 1 summarizes the findings and conclusions from the exploitation of mines recovered in and around coastal areas in the Falkland
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Quite often with aged ammunition, what you see is what you get;
if it looks badly degraded then generally it is.
Designation

Technical findings

Conclusion

FMK-1

Resilient casing resulting in the fuzing mechanism and
explosive train being well preserved.

These mines could have remained functional for many
years.

“M1”

Fuzing mechanism and explosive train remain well preserved, despite heavily degraded external appearance.

Some mines were still fully functional.

SB-33

Mines in good condition, with fuzing mechanism and
explosive train (particularly detonators) very well preserved.

These mines could have remained functional for many
years.

No. 4

Fuzing mechanisms complete but seized. Explosive
trains intact, with some detonators found to be functional.

Incapable of operating as designed. However, the presence of complete mechanical and explosive systems
carried the risk of unintended initiation mechanisms.

No. 6

Fuzing mechanisms complete but seized. Explosive
trains intact, with the possibility that some detonators
may remain functional.

Potentially capable of operation if subjected to substantial pressure or shock—could have been sensitized
during extraction.

P4B

Loss of structural integrity, allowing ingress of water.
Fuzing mechanisms incomplete due to rusting of the
striker spring. Detonators unlikely to function.

Two or more points of failure mean that these mines
were unlikely to operate.

SB-81

Fuzing mechanisms incomplete due to rusting of the
striker spring. Detonators unlikely to function.

Two points of failure mean that these mines were
unlikely to operate.

Table 1.

Recommendations
The results of the exploitation work were briefed to the demining
team leaders and management, and a number of recommendations

additional control measures. As a result of these findings, appropriate
adjustments to operating procedures were implemented.

were made. In particular, it was recommended that the LRC consider

Following the end of the clearance program, it was also recom-

the potential risk of initiation during the excavation or sifting process

mended that awareness messages and education on residual risks

with the M1 and No. 6 AT mines. They were also warned of the pos-

should include images of the mines as they now appear: aged, rather

sibility of sensitization during these processes, which could substan-

than as-new.

tially lower the operating threshold, and to therefore apply appropriate

Conclusion
Inevitably, mine populations will continue to degrade to the point

This conclusion, along with some of the surprising and counter-

where all eventually become safe. However, where previous studies

intuitive technical findings, reinforces the need for exploitation work

indicated that this state might be achieved relatively soon, findings

to provide a sound foundation for evidence-based decision-making.

from this recent work suggest that some mine types can remain func-

The global issue of residual risk from landmines is simply too impor-

tional for many years, even in the harshest environments.

tant to be based on assumption or myth.
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